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The current copyright system is intended to provide an incentive for authors to 
invest more time and effort in the creation of literary and artistic works (utilitarian 
argument), recognize the acquisition of a property right as a result of creative 
labour (natural law argument) and enhance authors’ freedom of expression by 
offering a source of income that is independent of patronage and sponsorship (free 
expression argument).1  These arguments may be combined with considerations of 
industry policy, such as the growth of the creative and telecommunication 
industries, and the creation of jobs in these industries.2  The basis of all these lines 
of reasoning, however, is the individual creator.  Without the constant efforts of 
creators, there would be no new literature and art to fuel the publication and 
dissemination machinery of the industry.  A focus on the income situation of the 
individual creator also ensures the acceptance of copyright law in society.  It adds 
social legitimacy.  Who would be against remunerating authors for the time and 
effort spent on the creation of a new work? 
There is thus substantial reason to explore legislative measures seeking to 
ensure that copyright law generates not only a sufficient return on investment for 
the creative industries but also a decent income for individual creators.  With 
specific copyright contract rules that guarantee a right to fair remuneration, the 
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 1. These arguments will be discussed in more detail in Section I.  For an overview of 
justifications for copyright protection, see Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Creators and Society’s Need 
for Autonomous Art—The Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives, in WHAT IF WE COULD 
REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 25, 28–32 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017); F. W. 
GROSHEIDE, AUTEURSRECHT OP MAAT:  BESCHOUWINGEN OVER DE GRONDSLAGEN VAN HET 
AUTEURSRECHT IN EEN RECHTSPOLITIEKE CONTEXT 127–29 (1986). 
 2. For an example of this line of argument in legislation, see Directive 2001/29/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Recital 4, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 10. 
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legislation in Germany and the Netherlands is particularly advanced in this 
respect.  Hence, the question arises:  what lessons can be learned from German 
and Dutch experiences?  After a short introduction that refers to recent E.U. 
initiatives in this area, the following analysis will show that the issue of a fair 
remuneration for creators has a worldwide dimension.  In light of the rationales of 
copyright protection in continental-European and Anglo-American copyright 
systems, it becomes clear that the high level of protection that has been reached in 
both legal traditions and at the international level only appears legitimate if 
individual creators receive an adequate remuneration for their work. 3   Fair 
remuneration is a universal, worldwide concern (Section I).  Against this 
background, the analysis sheds light on the practical effects of the legislation in 
Germany and the Netherlands (Section II) and leads to general guidelines for the 
improvement of the income situation of creators (Section III). 
I. WORLDWIDE DIMENSION 
Given the core rationale of copyright law to encourage and reward creators, the 
question arises whether the current copyright system is capable of ensuring a fair 
remuneration for creative work.  In the E.U., this issue is high on the agenda of law 
and policy makers.  In the framework of the current E.U. copyright reform, the E.U. 
Commission proposed to provide for a right of authors and performers “to request 
additional, appropriate remuneration from the party with whom they entered into a 
contract for the exploitation of the rights when the remuneration originally agreed 
is disproportionately low compared to the subsequent relevant revenues and 
benefits derived from the exploitation of the works or performances.”4 
At the core of this proposal lies the concern that authors and performers are 
often unable to obtain a fair remuneration for their creative work because of a weak 
bargaining position in contractual relationships with exploiters of their works and 
performances.  The E.U. Commission seeks to pave the way for “better balanced 
contractual relationships between authors and performers and those to whom they 
 
 3. As to the international level of protection, see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 
2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989); Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS––RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 
31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/94.  For commentary, see, e.g., LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ 
INTELLECTUELLE LIÉ AU COMMERCE:  L’ACCORD SUR LES ADPIC, BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES, 
(Christophe Geiger ed., 2017); Martin Senftleben, Commentary on the WIPO Copyright Treaty, in 
CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 93, 93–139 (Thomas Dreier & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2d ed., 
2016); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (4th ed., 2012); 
SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS:  THE 
BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2006); MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE 
INTERNET:  THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002); JÖRG 
REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: COMMENTARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(2002). 
 4. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, at 30, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016). 
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assign their rights.”5  The problem, however, is not limited to the E.U.  A closer 
analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the grant of exclusive rights in 
copyright law reveals that an adequate reward and an appropriate incentive for 
creative labour is a cornerstone of the justification of copyright protection not only 
in continental-European copyright systems but also in Anglo-American copyright 
law. 
Continental-European countries invoke the notion of natural law to explain why 
authors are vested with exclusive rights and entitled to a fair reward for their 
creative work.  Civil law copyright systems are often expressly rooted in natural 
law and tend to confer an air of “sacredness” on intellectual works.6  In the natural 
law theory, the creator of a work of art occupies centre stage.  Her unique form of 
self-expression which emerges in the course of the creative process leading to a 
work constitutes the centre of gravity.7  It is assumed that a bond unites the creator 
with the object of her creation.  Hence, the work is conceived as a materialization 
of the author’s personality.8  Moreover, the creator acquires a property right in her 
work by virtue of the mere act of creation.9  This has the corollary that nothing is 
left to the law apart from formally recognising what is already inherent in the “very 
nature of things.”10  The author-orientation of civil law copyright systems calls on 
the legislator to ensure that creators have the opportunity to benefit from the use 
and exploitation of their self-expression. 
The common law approach to copyright rests on utilitarian considerations. 11  
Anglo-American copyright systems envision intellectual property rights as a 
utilitarian notion that fails to indicate an inherent right of authors to their 
creations.12  Seeking instead to enhance the benefits for society, advocates of the 
common law approach invoke marketplace principles.  The grant of copyright 
protection is seen as a vehicle to spur the creation of socially valuable works.  
Accordingly, the resulting system of copyright protection mirrors the reliance on 
 
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. See, e.g., André Kéréver, Droits d’Auteur et Développements Techniques, 148 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 13 (1991); Bernard Edelman, The Law’s Eye:  Nature and 
Copyright, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 79, 82–87 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994). 
 7. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and 
Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 159, 169–70, supra note 6; Alain Strowel, Droit 
d’auteur and Copyright: Between History and Nature, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 6; 
Edelman, supra note 6, at 82–7. 
 8. This is a long-standing assumption in the civil law copyright tradition.  See, e.g., HENRI 
DESBOIS, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 538 (2d ed., 1973) (“L’auteur est protégé comme tel, en 
qualité de créateur, parce qu’un lien l’unit à l’objet de sa création.”). 
 9. See, e.g., DESBOIS, supra note 8, at 538; Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of 
Property Rights in Information:  Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate 
Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 310, 312–16 (1998). 
 10. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS 5–6 (1987). 
 11. See, e.g., Strowel, supra note 7, at 235; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1686–92 (1988). 
 12. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1150, 
1211, 1214–15 (1998); Calandrillo, supra note 9, at 310. 
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the motivating power of economic incentives.  The promise of monetary rewards is 
offered to the creators of literary and artistic works as a bait to encourage their 
intellectual productivity. 13   Copyright is perceived as an “engine of free 
expression.”14  A marketable right is conferred to ensure a sufficient supply of 
knowledge and information. 
The outlined differences in the theoretical underpinnings of copyright 
protection, however, must not be overestimated.  A closer inspection of early 
literary property regimes brings to light a wide array of similarities.  The first 
copyright statute, known as the Statute of Anne (1709), lays the groundwork for 
both the English and U.S. copyright laws.15  As an “Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of 
such Copies,” it pursues the objective to offer authors an incentive to create.  Its 
preamble maintains that the Act aims at the “Encouragement of Learned Men to 
Compose and Write Useful Books.”16  The Statute obviously rests on utilitarian 
notions.  The grant of copyright protection is intended to encourage authors to write 
books for the benefit of society.  This utilitarian foundation of the Anglo-American 
copyright tradition, however, was laid in an intellectual climate pervaded by the 
ideas of John Locke.17  His elaboration of a natural right to property in his Second 
Treatise on Government is traditionally invoked as a basis for the natural law 
approach to copyright which prevails in continental-European countries.  Locke’s 
labour theory influenced not only the decisions Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. 
Beckett, which had to respond to the question of whether there exists a common 
law copyright that is rooted in natural law and is thus independent of the 
stipulations of the Statute of Anne.18  It was also reflected in the dawn of U.S. 
copyright legislation.  All of the states except Delaware enacted copyright statutes 
before the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, thereby for the most part 
unequivocally referring to principles of natural law.19  Not surprisingly, throughout 
the nineteenth century, U.S. courts defended copyright on the grounds of rightness 
and justice far more than as a matter of the public good even though the first U.S. 
copyright statute ultimately reflects the intention to apply copyright, along the 
utilitarian lines drawn in the Statute of Anne, as a means of fostering public 
 
 13. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 9, at 310–12; Geller, supra note 7, at 159, 164–66. 
 14. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 15. For a detailed discussion of the Statute of Anne and its ongoing importance, see GLOBAL 
COPYRIGHT:  THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 
(Lionel Bently et al., eds., 2010). 
 16. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights:  Literary Property in Revolutionary France 
and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 131, 137, supra note 6; LUDWIG GIESEKE, VOM PRIVILEG 
ZUM URHEBERRECHT:  DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES URHEBERRECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND BIS 1845, 138–39 
(1995). 
 17. Cf. ALAIN STROWEL,  DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT, 185–90 (1993). 
 18. Cf. GIESEKE, supra note 16, at 139–40; STROWEL, supra note 17, at 114–15. 
 19. Cf. Weinreb, supra note 12, at 1211–12.  See also Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 139 (referring 
to the preamble to the Massachusetts Act of March 17, 1783); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1996) (quoting the preamble to Connecticut’s 1783 
copyright statute). 
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education.20  In practice, courts thus did not hesitate to intersperse the utilitarian 
framework laid down in early Anglo-American copyright statutes with notions 
stemming from the natural law theory. 
A corresponding tendency to intermingle natural law and utilitarian 
considerations can be observed in the history of continental-European copyright 
systems.  At an early stage of development, the notion of authors’ natural rights had 
not yet been linked with the romantic elaboration of criteria such as originality, 
organic form and the work of art as a materialization of the unique personality of 
the creator.  By contrast, it was often brought to the fore to mask manifest 
economic interests of booksellers. 21   The individual creator was used as a 
figurehead in this context.  The development of copyright law in Germany, for 
instance, bears witness to the invocation of Locke’s labour theory in favour of 
publishers.  The inefficiency of the German privilege system, caused by Germany’s 
territorial fragmentation, prompted various scholars to rely on the author’s natural 
right in his writings as a starting point for the explanation of the illegitimacy of 
unauthorized reprints.22 
The situation in France also shows that utilitarian objectives were hidden behind 
the rhetoric of natural law.  As Professor Jane Ginsburg has shown, the French 
enactments of 1791 and 1793 reflect several instrumentalist objectives.  The 
defence of the public domain against the monopoly enjoyed by the Comédie 
Française, for instance, can be regarded as the main principle of the 1791 law 
instead of the focus on author’s rights as “the most sacred, the most legitimate, the 
most inviolable, and . . . the most personal of all properties”.23  Ginsburg maintains 
that, in 1793, the French Revolutionary legislators applied an amalgam of the 
notion of authors’ natural rights and enlightenment values.24  The latter support the 
public interest in the progress of knowledge rather than strong property rights in 
intellectual works.  Therefore, the 1793 decree need not necessarily be regarded as 
 
 20. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 140; Weinreb, supra note 12, at 1212–13 (pointing out that 
early treatises dealing with copyright law are to the same effect). 
 21. See Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 295–96 (1992).  With respect to “The Battle of Booksellers,” see 
STROWEL, supra note 17, at 114–15. As to the situation in France, see Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 149. 
 22. See, e.g., JOHANN STEPHAN PÜTTER, DER BÜCHERNACHDRUCK NACH ÄCHTEN 
GRUNDSÄTZEN DES RECHTS GEPRÜFT §§ 20, 23 (Kraus Int’l Publications 1981) (1774) (basing his 
argumentation against unauthorised reprints on the assumption that new literary works that are published 
for the first time are “gleich ursprünglich unstreitig ein wahres Eigenthum ihres Verfassers, so wie ein 
jeder das, was seiner Geschicklichkeit und seinem Fleisse sein Daseyn zu danken hat, als sein 
Eigenthum ansehen kann.”). See also WALTER BAPPERT, WEGE ZUM URHEBERRECHT 256–57 (1962); 
Gieseke, supra note 16, at 121–22.  In the context of Anglo-American copyright law, see Peter Jaszi, 
Authorship and New Technologies from the Viewpoint of Common Law Traditions, in WIPO 
WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 61, 65 (1994) 
(similarly pointing out that, “effectively, ‘authorship’ had been introduced into English law as a blind 
for the booksellers’ interests, and it continued to perform that function throughout the eighteenth 
century––and beyond.”). 
 23. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 144–45.  The quoted passage is taken from an often quoted 
statement made by Le Chapelier, who reported on the 1791 decree, which is also quoted by Ginsburg.  
She asserts that Le Chapelier’s remark merely concerned unpublished works.  Id. at 144. 
 24. Id. at 147-51. 
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a tribute paid to natural law theory.  In reality, there is substantial reason to believe 
that this piece of copyright legislation formed part of a much broader scheme 
seeking to promote public education. 25   Not surprisingly, the 1793 law bears 
features that call to mind utilitarian Anglo-American statutes, such as the 
compliance with formalities as a prerequisite for suit.26 
Hence, copyright law’s early development is defined by a mixture of notions 
that are often exclusively assigned to the sphere of one legal tradition of copyright 
law.  The historical common ground of copyright’s legal traditions influences both 
of them to this day.  Professor Lloyd Weinreb, for instance, has pointed out that 
even though the natural rights argument has been muted in recent years, it still 
remains a significant undercurrent of the U.S. copyright system.27  The accession of 
common law countries to the Berne Convention also indicates that these countries 
are not necessarily loath to depart from their utilitarian basis, at least to some 
extent.  The UK was among the first countries that became party to the Convention 
in 1887.  India and Australia followed in 1928 and the U.S. in 1989.  Pursuant to its 
preamble, the Berne Convention is not inspired with an aim to enhance the benefits 
for society, but animated by the “desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a 
manner as possible, the rights of authors.”  This formula recalls the creator-centric 
natural law concept.28 
On the side of civil law countries, the traditional natural law foundation of 
copyright law is increasingly enriched with the notion that copyright law can serve 
as a means to further intellectual, cultural, and cultural-economic progress.  
Notions of this kind feature prominently in the European Copyright Directive 
2001/29/EC which constitutes the cornerstone of harmonized E.U. copyright law.  
Pursuant to Recital 4 of the Directive:  “[A] harmonised legal framework on 
copyright and related rights . . . will foster substantial investment in creativity and 
innovation . . . and lead in turn to growth and increased competitiveness of 
European industry. . . . This will safeguard employment and encourage new job 
creation.”29 
To conceive of the two traditions of copyright law as two incompatible, separate 
systems thus hardly portrays the actual situation accurately.  By contrast, the two 
traditions of copyright are mixtures of a shared set of basic ideas derived from both 
natural law theory and utilitarian notions alike.  Not surprisingly, the need to ensure 
a fair remuneration for the creative work of authors is a shared concern as well.  It 
constitutes a universal concern that is relevant to copyright systems worldwide, 
 
 25. Id. at 146. 
 26. Id. at 147-51.  Nevertheless, Alain Strowel points out that the protection itself was 
independent of any formalities.  STROWEL, supra note 17, at 314 
 27. See Weinreb, supra note 12, at 1216; Cf. Sterk, supra note 19, at 1198-204; Jaszi, supra note 
21, at 297-302 (presenting court decisions that support this proposition).  Jaszi states that “over the 
history of Anglo-American copyright, Romantic ‘authorship’ has served the interests of publishers and 
other distributors surprisingly well.”  Id. at 298. 
 28. Cf. Geller, supra note 7, at 170; Strowel, supra note 7, at 249-50. 
 29. Recital 4 of Council Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, 2001 O.J. (L 106). 
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even though the debate on fair remuneration rights may accentuate different aspects 
of the shared theoretical groundwork. 
The natural law argument supporting a right to fair remuneration appeals to 
feelings of rightness and justice.  As it is the individual creator who spends time 
and effort on the creation of a new work, she should reap the fruit of her labour.30  
To explain the creator’s reward claim, advocates of the natural law approach can 
invoke Locke’s elaboration of a natural right to property in his Second Treatise on 
Government.  Locke envisions an unrestricted supply of resources in a world of 
abundance, and individuals enjoying the rightful liberty to use the earth’s plenty.31  
In this world, so runs Locke’s argument, whenever one mixes his effort with the 
raw stuff of the world, he has joined to it “something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property.  It being by him removed from the common state nature hath 
placed it in, it hath by this labor something annexed to it that excludes the common 
right of other men”.32  While the real world bears little resemblance to Locke’s 
world of abundance, a certain degree of similarity can hardly be denied in the realm 
of intangible products.  Because of the “public good” character of intellectual 
works, later authors are free, insofar as access is conceded, to ground their own 
creative activities in the creations of their predecessors without diminishing the 
intellectual world’s supply of ideas and individual expression.33 
Consequently, a line has been drawn between Locke’s elaboration of a natural 
right to property in a world of abundance and the author’s right to her creation in 
the world of ideas and individual expression.  The mechanism of acquiring 
property, in both worlds, is the same. The property right results directly from 
mixing labor with the raw material found in the respective world of abundance.  As 
the author spends time and effort on the creation of a new intellectual work, this 
work becomes her property.  The reference to Locke’s labor theory, however, is not 
only conducive to explaining the sudden change of creative labor in intellectual 
property, but also helps to clarify certain further ramifications of the natural law 
approach to copyright.  Locke’s concept of acquiring property in a world of 
abundance is an individualistic one.  The laborer is given an isolated position.  By 
postulating an unrestricted supply of resources, it becomes possible to focus on the 
individual laborer at the moment when property is acquired, instead of considering 
 
 30. Cf. Grosheide, supra note 1, at 128 (argument B). 
 31. Cf. W.J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1553 (1993); Weinreb, supra note 12, at 
1223; Strowel, supra note 17, at 184. 
 32. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT book 2, chapter 5, § 27 (1689); Cf. 
Strowel, supra note 17, at 183. 
 33. Cf. Weinreb, supra note 12, 1224.  With respect to the “public good” character of literary and 
artistic works, see NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 84-85 (Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Richard Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 57, 57-59 (2005); Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on 
Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV 
1067, 1077 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV 354, 392-93 (1999); William Landes & Richard 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989); Fisher, supra 
note 11, at 1700. 
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the potential implications for the overall welfare of society.  The surrounding in 
which Locke places his elaboration of a natural right to property thus allows 
concentration on a single occurrence:  the act of mixing labor with the raw material 
of the envisioned world.  Under these circumstances, the individual merit of the 
laborer can be made visible in order to explain her natural right to property and her 
reward claim. 
In contrast to this individualistic conception, utilitarian arguments in favor of 
copyright protection rest on a theoretical basis which requires some kind of 
community.  Utilitarian theory conceives of property as a conventionally 
recognized stability of possession.  The convention thereby arises out of the 
perception that individual advantage can be derived from mutual forbearance to 
interfere with the possessions of others.  Any security of possessions stems from 
the belief that the establishment of a lasting association will be impossible as long 
as members of the envisioned community trespass against one another.34  In the 
course of development towards a permanently ordained association, the evolving 
practice of mutual forbearance is fortified through an established set of rules.  On 
the basis of utilitarian theory, private property is therefore rooted in the historical 
evolution of the customary acceptance of certain rules.35 
In this framework of ingrained habits, so runs a further argument:  a high level 
of productivity depends on arrangements which assure to every laborer a 
predictable amount of the fruits of her labor.  It is assumed that the time and effort 
necessary to create a new product will not be spent unless generally accepted rules 
guarantee that the laborer is permitted to enjoy a substantial share of the product.36  
In this line of reasoning, the utilitarian approach to copyright relies on the 
motivating power of the grant of exclusive rights.  As these rights afford a creator 
the control of the use and enjoyment of her intellectual work, they offer the 
possibility of deriving economic benefit from a work’s creation.  Copyright 
protection, thus, is understood as an incentive to create.  The legal assurance that 
exclusive rights in works of the intellect will be conferred on every author is 
offered as bait to encourage intellectual productivity.  The U.S. Constitution 
reflects this theoretical model by stating that it seeks “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”37 
Similar to natural law theory, the utilitarian approach to copyright, therefore, 
offers support for the objective to ensure a fair remuneration for the author’s 
creative work.  Otherwise, copyright could hardly provide an incentive for the 
creation of new literary and artistic works.  In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 
the U.S. Supreme Court referred to copyright as the “engine of free expression”.38  
 
 34. See Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1208-209 (1967) (providing a description of 
utilitarian theories based on Hume and Bentham). 
 35. Id. at 1209-10. 
 36. Id. at 1211-12. 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 38. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
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It went on to elaborate that “by establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s 
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate 
ideas.”39  This line of reasoning receives an additional connotation when it is traced 
back to the age of enlightenment when traditional systems of censorship gave way 
to the copyright system.40  If copyright offers authors the opportunity to derive 
sufficient economic profit from their works, it ensures the creators of intellectual 
works independence from any kind of patronage that might seek to restrict their 
freedom of expression.41  The users of copyrighted material, in turn, can enjoy 
works that have been created in the absence of manipulation and censorship.  
Accordingly, copyright law promotes a free and independent intellectual debate as 
long as it ensures a fair remuneration that enables authors to earn a living on the 
basis of their creative work.42  
II. FAIR REMUNERATION LEGISLATION 
As the fair remuneration of creators is thus a precondition for the grant of 
exclusive rights in both traditions of copyright law (continental-European and 
Anglo-American countries alike), the question arises as to how copyright 
legislation can ensure the payment of a fair remuneration.  The answer to this 
question can hardly be found in the very nature of copyright itself.  Copyright law 
ensures that authors’ exploitation rights are marketable.  If, however, individual 
creators do not have sufficient bargaining power to insist on substantial economic 
benefits in negotiations with exploiters of their works,43 the mere grant of copyright 
will not improve their income situation.  By contrast, the creator of a literary or 
artistic work only serves as a provider of strong exploitation rights for the creative 
industries, without benefiting much herself.  This imbalance may discredit the 
protection system as a whole.  If copyright only serves as a vehicle to vest the 
creative industries with strong rights in information products while these rights are 
defended as a means to remunerate authors, the creators of literary and artistic 
works only function as a dummy to conceal the industry’s insatiable appetite for 
continuously expanding exclusive rights.  As a result, the arguments advanced in 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. For a historical analysis of the joint origin of freedom of expression and copyright, see E. 
DOMMERING ET AL., INFORMATIERECHT—FUNDAMENTELE RECHTEN VOOR DE 
INFORMATIESAMENLEVING 431-39 (Otto Cramwinckel ed., 2000); Neil Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 353-58 (1996). 
 41. Cf. Id. at 288 (stating that “copyright supports a sector of creative and communicative activity 
that is relatively free from reliance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy.”).   
 42. Cf. Id. at 288; P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, AUTEURSRECHT OP INFORMATIE 151, (Kluwer); Grosheide, 
supra note 1, at 139-41. 
 43. For an analysis of the bargaining position and income situation of individual creators, see 
MARTIN KRETSCHMER, SUKHPREETY SINGH, LIONEL BENTLY & ELENA COOPER, COPYRIGHT 
CONTRACTS AND EARNINGS OF VISUAL CREATORS: A SURVEY OF 5,800 BRITISH DESIGNERS, FINE 
ARTISTS, ILLUSTRATORS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS, (2011); JARST WEDA, ILAN AKKER, JOOST POORT, 
PETER RUTTEN, ANNEMARIE BEUNEN, WAT ER SPEELT – DE POSITIE VAN MAKERS EN UITVOEREND 
KUNSTENAARS IN DE DIGITALE OMGEVING, (SEO Economisch Onderzoek, 2011), https://perma.cc/6T99-
FFM6. These studies confirm that, in fact, the income situation of authors is precarious. 
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favor of copyright can be unmasked as false rhetoric 44 and the system’s social 
legitimacy is put at risk. 
To avoid this erosion of copyright’s acceptance in society, the lawmaker can 
seek to reduce the exposure to market forces and adopt measures that strengthen the 
position of creators vis-à-vis the creative industry.  In 2002, an example of this kind 
of legislation (an Act on Copyright Contract Law) entered into force in Germany.  
This legislation confers upon authors a right to fair remuneration (in their 
contractual relationships with exploiters of their works) besides the grant of 
traditional exploitation rights.  By virtue of § 32(1) of the German Copyright Act 
(Urheberrechtsgesetz; UrhG), as amended by the 2002 Copyright Contract Act, 
authors have the right to demand the modification of a contract about a work’s 
exploitation that fails to provide for a fair remuneration (see the more detailed 
discussion of this point in the following subsection II(A)).  The German legislation 
supplements this measure aiming at a fair remuneration ex ante (at the very 
beginning of the contractual relationship) with a right to fair remuneration that 
becomes relevant at a later stage.  If the work has market success to such an extent 
that the remuneration originally received appears disproportionally low, an ex post 
remuneration rule gives the author the right to demand an adjustment of the 
contract in the light of changed circumstances.  § 32a(1) UrhG states explicitly that 
the author can invoke this ex post remuneration right regardless of whether the 
parties could have foreseen the disproportionality between remuneration and 
revenue at the time of concluding the exploitation contract (subsection II(B)). 
A. FAIR REMUNERATION EX ANTE 
As explained, § 32(1) UrhG bestows on authors the right to demand the 
modification of a contract regarding a work’s exploitation that fails to provide for a 
fair remuneration.  § 32(2) UrhG makes it clear in this context that so-called 
“common remuneration rules” established in negotiations between a representative 
association of authors on the one hand, and an individual exploiter or an association 
of exploiters on the other hand (§ 36 UrhG), are to be deemed “fair” in this sense 
by virtue of the law.  Although the German Copyright Contract Act has now been 
in effect for more than ten years, these legislative measures have not led to the 
envisaged general improvement of the income situation of authors.45  Individual 
 
 44. Cf. Sterk, supra note 19, at 1197-98 (pointing out that “although some copyright protection 
indeed may be necessary to induce creative activity, copyright doctrine now extends well beyond the 
contours of the instrumental justification.  The 1976 statute and more recent amendments protect authors 
even when no plausible argument can be made that protection will enhance the incentive for authors to 
create.”). 
 45. See H. Maas, Kulturelle Werke – mehr als nur ein Wirtschaftsgut, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
URHEBER-UND MEDIENRECHT 207, 209 (2016); K.N. Peifer, Urhebervertragsrecht in der Reform: Der 
Kölner Entwurf, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT–PRAXIS IM IMMATERIALGÜTER- 
UND WETTBEWERBSRECHT 1, 1-2 (2015); G. Schulze, Vergütungssystem und Schrankenregelungen, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 828 (2005). For more nuanced comment, see also A. 
Dietz, Das Urhebervertragsrecht in Deutschland, in R.M. HILTY, C. GEIGER, IMPULSE FÜR EINE 
EUROPÄISCHE HARMONISIERUNG DES URHEBERRECHTS 465, (Springer, 2007).  Dietz qualifies the first 
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creators seem hesitant to assert their remuneration right in court.  As an exception 
to this rule, translators started court procedures that finally led to first decisions of 
the German Federal Court of Justice (German Supreme Court) on the question of 
fair remuneration.46  On balance, however, the determinants of what constitutes a 
fair remuneration in an individual case still seem too vague to allow the effective 
use and enforcement of the fair remuneration right.  As the party invoking the right 
to fair remuneration, the burden of proving that a contractually agreed remuneration 
falls short of the statutorily guaranteed fair remuneration rests on the author.  
Hence, she also carries the risk and costs of showing what a fair remuneration in 
the relevant sector of the creative industry would be, and that the concluded 
contract does not provide for this fair remuneration.47 
For cases in which no common remuneration rules are available, § 32(2) UrhG 
indicates that a remuneration can be considered fair when it complies with the 
remuneration which, according to the customary practices in the sector concerned, 
an author could reasonably expect in light of the scope and reach of the granted 
right, the duration and time of the use, and other circumstances relevant to the 
individual case.  These flexible factors, however, can hardly clarify the conceptual 
contours of the fair remuneration right.  In the absence of model contracts or other 
customary remuneration schemes that come close to common remuneration rules in 
the sense of § 36 UrhG, an author will still have difficulty proving that a 
contractually agreed remuneration is not fair on the basis of this vague definition of 
fairness. 48   Similarly, the author will have difficulty in assessing the risk of 
litigation regarding the remuneration question as long as there is no reliable 
information on the customary remuneration. 
Against this background, the additional option to invoke § 36 UrhG and 
formally establish common remuneration rules in collective negotiations between 
an association of authors and industry representatives is of particular practical 
importance.  By virtue of § 32(2) UrhG, a standard remuneration scheme of this 
type constitutes a legally binding definition of the fair remuneration in the relevant 
industry sector.  A common remuneration rule in the sense of § 36 UrhG thus 
provides the legal certainty necessary to assess the chances of court procedures.  It 
can also serve as a yardstick for proving the unfairness of a remuneration that does 
not comply with the standard described in the remuneration scheme. 
In Germany, the Common Remuneration Rules for Writers of German Fiction49 
constitute a prominent example of remuneration rules that were concluded on the 
basis of the German Copyright Contract Act in negotiations between the 
 
common remuneration rule that has been established under the new German legislation as a success of 
the system as a whole.  Id. at 473-74. 
 46. Federal Court of Justice, 7 October 2009, cases I ZR 38/07 and I ZR 230/06, available (in 
German) at https://perma.cc/7Z2F-TLKZ.  This case law will be discussed in more detail below.   
 47. See Schulze, supra note 45, at 829-830; Dietz, supra note 45, at 469. 
 48. See Schulze, supra note 45, at 829-830; A.A. Wandtke, Der Anspruch auf angemessene 
Vergütung für Filmurheber nach § 32 UrhG, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INT. 
704, 707 (2010). 
 49. These common remuneration rules are available (in German) at https://perma.cc/XN9T-
NQH4. 
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Association of German Writers in the United Services Trade Union Ver.di and 
several publishers.50  As no representative association of publishers entered the 
negotiations,51 it was difficult to foresee the impact of this standard remuneration 
rule on the sector as a whole.  The fact that the German Ministry of Justice had to 
mediate informally between the parties to ensure the adoption of the remuneration 
rules mirrors the difficulty of the negotiations.52 
Given the scarcity of common remuneration rules in the sense of § 36 UrhG,53 it 
is tempting for the courts to make extensive use of the existing rules.  As already 
indicated above, the German Federal Court of Justice had the opportunity to clarify 
the scope of common remuneration rules in cases that had been initiated by 
translators.  A collective remuneration rule for translators in the sense of § 36 UrhG 
was not available for a decision in these cases.  Moreover, the Federal Court of 
Justice had serious doubts about the customary remuneration in the translation 
sector.  Referring to the aforementioned general definition of “fair remuneration” in 
§ 32(2) UrhG, the Court pointed out that compliance with customary remuneration 
practices in a particular sector may nonetheless be insufficient in the light of the 
general fairness criteria formulated by the legislator:  “Even if a particular 
honorarium—as in this case—is customary in the sector, this does not necessarily 
mean that it is fair. By contrast, a given remuneration is only fair when it equally 
takes account of the interests of the author besides those of the exploiter.”54 
Having neither a common remuneration rule in the sense of § 36 UrhG nor an 
appropriate customary remuneration scheme in the sense of § 32(2) UrhG at its 
disposal, the Federal Court of Justice finally turned to the Common Remuneration 
Rules for Writers of German Fiction as a reference point for determining the fair 
remuneration of translators. 55   By analogy, the Court used the Common 
Remuneration Rules for Writers of German Fiction as a guideline for its decision 
on a fair level of remuneration for translators.  This wide application of common 
remuneration rules by the Court is remarkable because the Common Remuneration 
Rules for Writers of German Fiction explicitly exclude applicability to translated 
works.56  In addition, the Federal Court of Justice was unimpressed by the fact that 
 
 50. The rules were signed, for instance, by Rowohlt, S. Fischer and Random House. 
 51. See Kurzprotokoll der 14. Sitzung (öffentlich) der Enquete-Kommission DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG, ‘Kultur in Deutschland’ 3 May 2004, Protokoll Nr. 15/14, p. 13/4-13/5. (Ger.). 
 52. The mediation was informal in the sense that it was not a formal mediation procedure with a 
dispute commission under § 36a UrhG. See Schulze, supra note 45, at 830. 
 53. Cf. G. Spindler, Reformen der Vergütungsregeln im Urhebervertragsrecht, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT, 921, 921 (2012). 
 54. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 2009, case I ZR 38/07, 11, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 2009, 1148 (1150) with case comment by R. 
Jacobs; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 2009 I ZR 230/06, 12, 
available (in German) at https://perma.cc/ZX4U-9H3T. 
 55. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 2009, II ZR 38/07, 16, and I 
ZR 230/06, 15-16. 
 56. See Gemeinsame Vergütungsregeln für Autoren belletristischer Werke in deutscher Sprache, 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ n. 1, available at 
https://perma.cc/E4VD-U9G2; Contra Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 
2009., I ZR 38/07, 17, and I ZR 230/06, 16. 
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only one of the two cases brought by translators concerned fiction works.  The 
second case was about translations of non-fiction books.  The Court, however, 
surmounted the hurdle of “double” analogy.  It did not matter that the case 
concerned translators instead of writers, and it did not matter that it concerned non-
fiction instead of fiction books: 
Even though the remuneration rules . . . are not directly applicable to publication 
contracts for non-fiction books, there are no prevailing concerns against their use for 
the purpose of determining a fair remuneration for the translation of a non-fiction 
book. According to the findings of the Court of Appeals, none of the parties argued 
and no other circumstances suggest that the conditions of publication contracts for 
non-fiction books differ from those of contracts over fiction works to such an extent 
that the remuneration rules for writers could not be taken into account.57 
Using the Common Remuneration Rules for Writers of German Fiction as a 
guideline for the development of a fair remuneration standard for translators, the 
Court finally ruled that translators are entitled to two percent of the net retail price 
of hardcover editions and one percent in the case of paperback editions.  This 
amounts to one-fifth of the remuneration which, according to the Common 
Remuneration Rules for Writers of German Fiction, is due to writers.  If the 
publisher guarantees a honorarium that can be deemed reasonable in light of the 
custom in the sector, this right to fair remuneration is reduced to 0.8% for 
hardcover sales and 0.4% for paperback sales.  Furthermore, this reduced royalty 
only needs to be paid as of the 5000th copy sold.  In addition, translators are entitled 
to fifty percent of the net profits from the commercialization of ancillary rights.58 
This jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice shows that common 
remuneration rules in the sense of § 36 UrhG can have a broad field of application.  
In particular, judges may extend the scope of these rules to parties who have not 
been involved in the underlying negotiations.  A common remuneration rule may 
become a general yardstick for the establishment of fair remuneration standards in a 
given sector even though it was only concluded between specific parties and for a 
specific group of creators.  On its merits, the described decisions transform 
common remuneration rules into generally binding legal instruments with a 
considerable impact on remuneration standards in the respective branch of the 
creative industry. 
On the one hand, this approach can have positive effects for authors in a sector 
where no agreement on a common remuneration rule can be reached.  By invoking 
remuneration rules of a related sector or a related group of creators, German courts 
can nevertheless arrive at a fair remuneration standard and improve the income 
situation of authors by reference to remuneration standards in a comparable field.  
On the other hand, the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice can easily 
 
 57. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 2009, ibid., case I ZR 
230/06, para. 34. 
 58. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice] October 7, 2009, I ZR 38/07, 18-23, 
and I ZR 230/06, 18-23.  Nonetheless, this level of fair remuneration did not meet the expectations of 
translators.  Cf. Dietz, supra note 45, at 469. 
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become an additional obstacle to negotiations on common remuneration rules in the 
sense of § 36 UrhG.  If it is at all possible to find individual exploiters or business 
associations that are willing to speak about common remuneration rules in a 
particular branch, these exploiters and associations may be reluctant to enter into 
formal negotiations.  The hesitance is due to the risk of resulting fair remuneration 
standards being declared applicable to the whole sector afterwards by the courts.  
Given this risk of generalization, interested enterprises and associations may also 
face pressure from other players in the relevant sector who fear that the 
establishment of common remuneration rules in one particular branch may finally 
affect remuneration standards in the entire sector. 59   Nonetheless, the German 
Federal Court of Justice confirmed the broad application of common remuneration 
rules in later decisions.60 
In spite of the described problems, the underlying recipe—the combination of a 
right to fair remuneration with the possibility of establishing common remuneration 
standards in negotiations between authors and the creative industry—served as a 
model for other countries also seeking to enhance the credibility of the copyright 
system.  In the Netherlands, legislation that copies the core elements of the German 
system was adopted in 2015.61  Professor Bernt Hugenholtz and Lucie Guibault had 
laid the basis for this legislative development in 2004 by highlighting the problem 
of an increasingly weak bargaining position of individual creators and providing a 
comparative study of copyright contract legislation in other countries.62  After a 
lengthy legislative process,63 the adoption of the new copyright contract rules led to 
 
 59. Admittedly, the number of common remuneration rules in the sense of § 36 UrhG is 
nevertheless growing in Germany.  Cf. A. Dietz, Schutz der Kreativen (der Urheber und ausübenden 
Künstler) durch das Urheberrecht oder Die fünf Säulen des modernen kontinentaleuropäischen 
Urheberrechts, 1 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT – INTERNATIONALER TEIL 
2015, 309, 315–16.  The scope of these rules, however, is often limited to specific groups of authors and 
exploiters.  For example, see the initiatives in the area of public broadcasting described by P. Weber, 
Rahmenverträge und gemeinsame Vergütungsregeln nach Urhebervertragsrecht – aus der Praxis des 
ZDF, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT 2013, 740, 742–45. On balance, the result can 
thus still be seen as unsatisfactory.  See Spindler, supra note 53, at 921. 
 60. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], [Federal Court of Justice], May 21, 2015, case I ZR 62/14, GVR 
Tageszeitungen I, operative part available (in German) at https://perma.cc/Z94L-T29M. 
 61. See the Law of 30 June 2015 changing the Dutch Copyright Act and the Neighbouring Rights 
Act in connection with the strengthening of the position of authors and performing artists in contracts 
concerning copyright and neighbouring rights (Copyright Contract Act), Staatsblad 2015, 257, which led 
to a new section in the Dutch Copyright Act (Arts. 25b-25h) dealing specifically with authors’ contract 
rights.  
 62. P.B. Hugenholtz & L. Guibault, Auteurscontractenrecht: naar een wettelijke regeling?, 
AMSTERDAM: INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW (IViR) 2004, available at 
www.ivir.nl/publicaties/overig/auteurscontractenrecht.pdf.   
 63. As to the long preparatory work for the new legislation, see Ministerie van Veiligheid en 
Justitie, 12 June 2012, Wetsvoorstel auteurscontractenrecht, KAMERSTUKKEN II 2011/12, 33 308, in 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 23 (2013); B.J. Lenselink, 
Auteurscontractenrecht 2.0 – Het wetsvoorstel inzake het auteurscontractenrecht, 1TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT 7 (2013); E. Wybenga, Ongebonden werk – Is de literaire 
sector gebaat bij het voorontwerp auteurscontractenrecht?, 1 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN 
INFORMATIERECHT 41 (2011); D. Peeperkorn, De lange geschiedenis van het auteurscontractenrecht, 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT 167 (2010); J.P. Poort & J.J.M. Theeuwes, 
Prova d’Orchestra – Een economische analyse van het voorontwerp auteurscontractenrecht, 
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a right of authors to receive a fair remuneration in exchange for the grant of an 
exploitation entitlement (regardless of whether the basis of this entitlement is a 
transfer of rights or a licensing agreement).  The new right is set forth in Article 
25c(1) of the Dutch Copyright Act (Auteurswet; Aw).  As the Dutch legislator was 
alert to the difficulty of proving an insufficient level of remuneration in the absence 
of clear remuneration standards, Article 25c(2) Aw entitles the Dutch Minister of 
Education, Culture and Science to fix the level of fair remuneration with regard to a 
specific branch of the creative industry and for a particular period of time in an 
administrative regulation.  However, this formal fixation mechanism can only be 
set in motion on joint request of a representative association of authors, and an 
individual exploiter or a representative association of exploiters in the sector 
concerned.  The request must contain a joint recommendation that clearly describes 
the agreed level of fair remuneration and clearly demarcates the relevant branch of 
the creative industry (Article 25c(3) Aw).64 
Regardless of this export success of the German model, the question remains 
how fair remuneration legislation could be rendered more effective in practice.  A 
clearer definition of the underlying concept of fairness, a reversal of the burden of 
proof with regard to evidence of remuneration standards in a given sector, extra 
incentives for the creative industry to enter into collective negotiations with 
associations of authors and, as a last resort, the imposition of a legal obligation to 
establish common remuneration rules could be considered in this context.  In the 
drafting process underlying the German legislation, a far-reaching obligation to 
accept common remuneration standards was contemplated by the legislator with 
regard to situations where the parties involved in negotiations, finally, could not 
reach agreement.  A common remuneration rule could then also have been 
established in compulsory settlement procedures or through a court decision. 65  
This proposal, however, was rejected because of fears that it would encroach upon 
fundamental freedoms of enterprises and business associations:  in particular the 
general freedom of action and the negative freedom of not being obliged to enter 
into coalitions. 66   Legislation that imposes a de facto obligation to establish 
 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT 137 (2010); M.R.F. Senftleben, 
Exportschlager deutsches Urhebervertragsrecht? Het voorontwerp auteurscontractenrecht in Duits 
perspectief, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT 146 (2010); H. Cohen 
Jehoram, Komend auteurscontractenrecht, INTELLECTUELE EIGENDOM EN RECLAMERECHT 303 (2008). 
 64. For a more detailed description of the new fair remuneration legislation in the Netherlands, 
see A.G.I. Terhorst, Auteurscontractenrecht: er is een wettelijke regeling!, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT 162, 162 (2015).  
 65. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Stärkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern und 
ausübenden Künstlern’, Drucksache, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, June 26, 2001, 14/6433, 4 (§ 36(3), (5) 
to (8)) and p. 17; Kurzprotokoll der 14. Sitzung (öffentlich) der Enquete-Kommission DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG, ‘Kultur in Deutschland’ 3 May 2004, , Protokoll Nr. 15/14, p. 13/4-13/5. (Ger.). 
 66. As to the guarantee of these freedoms in German constitutional law, see Articles 2(1) and 9 of 
GRUNDGESTEZ [GG] [Basic Law], translation available at https://perma.cc/9RRF-3ZGW.; Cf. H. 
Schack, Neuregelung des Urhebervertragsrechts, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECH 453, 
462 (2001). See also N.P. Flechsig/K. Hendricks, Zivilprozessuales Schiedsverfahren zur Schließung 
urheberrechtlicher Gesamtverträge – Zweckmäßige Alternative oder Sackgasse?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
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common remuneration rules thus seems excessive.67  Recent proposals seeking to 
further improve the German system, however, include the clarification that a fair 
remuneration, in principle, requires more than a one-time “buy out” payment.  
Instead, the author should continuously receive a share of the revenue accruing 
from the exploitation of her work.68 
More generally, antitrust concerns may affect the concept of negotiations 
between an association of authors and industry representatives.  In § 36(1) UrhG, 
the German legislator entrusts associations of authors and exploiters with the task 
of fixing common remuneration standards.  To this day, however, it is unclear 
whether this task assignment in the law itself is sufficient to dispel concerns about 
incompliance with antitrust legislation.  Already during the drafting phase, the 
reliance on collective negotiations was criticized for encouraging cartel 
negotiations and being in conflict with E.U. competition law.69  Nevertheless, E.U. 
competition authorities have refrained from measures against collective 
negotiations in Germany so far.  Against this background, § 36 UrhG is believed to 
comply with E.U. antitrust standards. 
Besides the inactivity of E.U. competition authorities, this assumption is based 
on the argument that individual authors often depend on the creative industry to the 
same extent as employees.  Only formally, they have the status of self-employed 
freelancers with individual businesses.  Therefore, negotiations on remuneration 
standards between associations of freelance authors and creative industry 
representatives are deemed not to be comparable with the formation of cartels in 
other cases where powerful businesses are on both sides.  In addition, it is noted 
that common remuneration rules in the sense of § 36 UrhG only provide general 
guidelines for determining a fair level of remuneration.  They do not readily fix the 
individual remuneration due to the author.  As explained by Adolf Dietz, 
[t]he legal effect of common remuneration rules, namely the irrefutable assumption 
based on § 32(2), first sentence, that a remuneration complying with the rules is fair, 
does not consist of a mutual obligation to apply the rules in contracts.  By contrast, 
their legal effect follows from the law itself.  Common remuneration rules are 
collectively developed remuneration standards but not remuneration agreements.  In 
the sense of antitrust law, they are thus to be regarded as an aliud.70 
 
URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT 721 (2001) (for an assessment of the pros and cons of a formal 
settlement procedure). 
 67. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Spindler, supra note 53, at 925–28. 
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Depending on the position taken in the debate on compliance with antitrust 
standards, the German system for the establishment of common remuneration rules 
may thus also appear problematic from the perspective of competition law.  
Therefore, copyright legislation seeking to improve the income situation of creators 
should not exclusively rely on the recognition of a right to fair remuneration.  On 
its merits, this legislative measure rests on the vague hope that agreements on 
appropriate remuneration standards will evolve from negotiations between authors 
and the creative industry, and that these standards will survive further scrutiny in 
the light of antitrust standards.  Given these unpredictable factors, additional 
instruments seem necessary to ensure that authors receive a fair monetary reward 
for their creative work. 
While a general right to fair remuneration ex ante may be of particular 
importance to authors whose works are likely to be commercially successful in the 
marketplace, the difficulty of providing evidence for a certain level of standard 
remuneration in a specific field of creativity is likely to constitute an almost 
insurmountable hurdle for less successful authors (at least as long as no binding 
common remuneration rule has been adopted in the sector concerned).  To improve 
the income situation of these latter authors, a remuneration concept presupposing 
the existence of a customary level of fair remuneration seems inapt.  In addition, 
authors may fear negative reactions in the creative sector concerned when they 
insist on the right to fair remuneration.  Facing a relatively small circle of investors 
and producers, a creator may be concerned about seeing her name being added to a 
“black list” of persons with whom exploiters do not want to work because of past 
disputes about insufficient remuneration.  
B. FAIR REMUNERATION EX POST 
Once a work has success, however, the author may have a particular interest in a 
remuneration rule that ensures fair profit sharing ex post.  If the work becomes 
successful in the market to such an extent that the remuneration originally received 
appears disproportionally low, an ex post remuneration rule ensures that the author 
can demand an adjustment of the contract in the light of changed circumstances.  
Again, copyright legislation in Germany can serve as an example in this context.  
Prior to the introduction of the above-described 2002 Act on Copyright Contract 
Law, the German Copyright Act already contained a safeguard against a contractual 
remuneration scheme that turned out to be disproportionate in the course of a 
work’s exploitation:  the so-called “bestseller clause” was regarded as an important 
addition to the general rule on imprévision in the German Civil Code.  It softened 
the requirement that new circumstances justifying an adjustment of the 
remuneration had to be unforeseeable for contracting parties at the time of 
concluding the exploitation contract.  The strict application of this requirement had 
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rendered the general imprévision rule in the German Civil Code ineffective in many 
copyright cases.71  Against this background, the traditional bestseller clause in the 
German copyright system was based on an alternative threshold for requesting an 
adjustment of the remuneration:  a showing of “gross” disproportionality.  This 
condition was deemed to be fulfilled when the honorarium received by the author 
amounted to only one-third of what would have constituted a usual royalty revenue 
when taking into account the work’s success.72 
In the 2002 Act on Copyright Contract Law, the German legislator replaced this 
bestseller clause with a more elastic “fairness clause.”  In § 32a(1) UrhG, it was 
stated explicitly that this new fairness clause could be invoked regardless of 
whether the parties could have foreseen the disproportionality between 
remuneration and revenue when entering into the exploitation contract.  The 
condition of “gross” disproportionality was attenuated by setting forth a threshold 
of “striking” disproportionality instead.  In the official materials accompanying the 
2002 Act, the German legislator explained that this new requirement could be 
deemed to be met when the author had received a honorarium amounting to less 
than half of the income that would have been fair considering the work’s success.73  
The German Federal Court of Justice took this fifty-percent-rule from the 
legislative history as a starting point.  In the decision Fluch der Karibik, the Court 
stated that, in any case, there was a striking disproportionality if the contractually 
agreed remuneration reached only half of the remuneration that would have been 
fair.  The Court added that in light of the individual circumstances of the 
relationship between the creator and the exploiter, a smaller deviation from the fair 
remuneration standard could be sufficient as well.74  The ruling thus leaves the door 
open for a more flexible application of the fairness clause in favor of creators.  In 
literature, it has been argued that even a deviation of twenty percent may already be 
sufficient to assume a striking disproportionality.75 
As the traditional bestseller clause, the new fairness clause covers all kinds of 
contracts awarding exploitation entitlements.  Its scope of application ranges from 
transfers and exclusive licenses to non-exclusive licenses and specific permissions 
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of use, such as permission to translate or adapt a work.76  Moreover, the new 
provision makes it clear that in the case of a license chain, the author can assert the 
right to ex post adjustment of the remuneration against every license holder (§ 
32a(2) UrhG).  It is thus irrelevant whether a licensee was involved in the original 
honorarium negotiations and received the exploitation entitlement directly from the 
author.  In 2015, the Dutch legislator also opted for an ex post fair remuneration 
rule allowing authors to insist on additional remuneration in case a “serious” 
disproportionality arises in light of the revenue accruing from the work’s 
exploitation (Article 25d(1) Aw).  However, Dutch courts have not had the 
opportunity to clarify the threshold requirement of serious disproportionality yet. 
Arguably, the ex post adjustment measures in Germany and the Netherlands are 
more effective than attempts to secure a fair remuneration ex ante—at a stage where 
a work’s exploitation has not yet started.  Support for ex post remuneration 
mechanisms can also be found in international copyright law.  The optional droit de 
suite recognized in Art. 14ter(1) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works grants the author and her heirs an interest in any sale of 
original works of art and original manuscripts subsequent to the work’s first 
transfer.  As bestseller and fairness legislation seeking to ensure an additional 
income in case of disproportionality between initial remuneration and later 
revenues, this international provision aims to ensure that the author receives a share 
of profits accruing from a work’s successful exploitation at a later stage. 
A final aspect of the debate on ex post remuneration rules concerns the cross-
financing of productions.  When ex post measures are taken to adjust the 
remuneration in the case of works having huge market success, exploiters may 
warn of shrinking budgets for the financing of less successful productions.  The 
income from bestsellers, so runs the argument, is needed to compensate for the 
losses stemming from unsuccessful works.  If the creative industry must share 
profits accruing from bestsellers with the creators, the potential of bestseller 
productions for levelling out losses resulting from investment in commercially 
insecure productions is reduced.  This may limit the willingness of the creative 
industry to invest in unorthodox works of unknown artists.  If it was true that the 
creative industry used the income from successful productions to finance less 
promising productions, ex post adjustments of revenue streams leading to a higher 
income for creators might have the effect of reducing the budget available for less 
secure productions of unknown authors. 
In the absence of an economic analysis confirming this alleged interdependence 
of investment decisions, however, it cannot readily be assumed that the alleged 
cross-financing of productions is taking place, and that it would be frustrated by ex 
post adjustments of remuneration schemes for bestsellers.  These ex post 
adjustments would only occur when a work’s market success has not already been 
factored into the equation at the time of concluding the exploitation contract.  Once 
a creator is known as a bestseller author, she will have the bargaining power 
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necessary to negotiate an adequate remuneration in the initial exploitation contract.  
Hence, ex post adjustments only impact the calculations of the creative industry in 
case a work was not expected to have outstanding commercial success so that the 
creator had limited bargaining power.  Even if the alleged practice of cross-
financing exists, it is thus unclear whether these exceptional cases would minimize 
industry profits to such an extent that the alleged subsidizing of insecure 
productions becomes unfeasible. 
C. OTHER FAIR REMUNERATION MEASURES 
In the Netherlands, the discussion on legislation ensuring a proper remuneration 
of authors shed light on a potential further measure to ensure a fair remuneration of 
authors.  In a preliminary proposal for new legislation, the Dutch Ministry of 
Justice had proposed the partitioning of a work’s exploitation period into intervals 
of five years.  Every five years, the exploitation rights would return to the author 
who could then grant them anew.  The rationale underlying this proposal was the 
hope that this would give the author the opportunity to renegotiate exploitation 
contracts and adapt them to changing circumstances every five years.  Instead of 
strengthening the position of authors, however, this proposal is likely to have a 
corrosive effect in practice.  If the maximum period of exploitation which an author 
can offer at the beginning of a work’s exploitation is only five years, the creative 
industry will only pay for an exploitation horizon of five years.  If the work does 
not have enough success to offer promising exploitation prospects for a second 
five-year term, the author will have difficulty finding another exploiter willing to 
pay for a further five-year period.  She may thus see her reward for the work being 
reduced to a single payment for an exploitation period of five years instead of 
receiving a payment for the entire term of copyright. 
Legislators considering a rule of fixed exploitation intervals would thus have to 
ensure that the initial period of exclusivity which an author can offer is long 
enough to cover the entire exploitation horizon and amortization period underlying 
the investment decision of the creative industry concerned. 77   Otherwise, such 
legislation will only shift the risk of market success from exploiters to authors.  The 
result would be a weakening of the position of authors not creating bestsellers and a 
lower income for works that do not become evergreens.  Against this background, 
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it is doubtful whether fixed exploitation intervals are an effective tool to ensure a 
fair remuneration of creators. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For lawmakers aiming at appropriate remuneration mechanisms for individual 
creators, the debate on fair remuneration in Germany and the Netherlands yields 
important guidelines.  In particular, exploitation contracts offering authors a 
revenue share seem more desirable than fixed one-time honoraria in “buy out” 
contracts.  A remuneration scheme ensuring a continuous royalty stream reduces 
the risk of disproportionality between remuneration and revenue from the outset.  
As a legislative measure, it is thus advisable to encourage remuneration in the form 
of royalty percentages and discourage agreements based on lump sum honoraria as 
the only form of remuneration. 
Considering the advantages of remuneration in the form of royalty percentages, 
the ex post remuneration rules—bestseller clauses—that have been adopted in 
Germany and the Netherlands are of particular importance.  They encourage the 
creative industry to give authors an appropriate share of the royalties accruing from 
a work’s continuous exploitation.  Otherwise, the exploiter of a work remains 
exposed to the risk of a disproportionally low remuneration and an ex post 
remuneration claim.  Viewed from this perspective, Article 15 of the proposed E.U. 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market78 constitutes an important first 
step in the right direction.  It would lead to a harmonized bestseller clause—and the 
option of ex post fair remuneration claims—in the E.U. 
The development of effective ex ante remuneration rules, however, remains a 
particularly difficult task.  The German and Dutch systems of voluntary 
negotiations about common remuneration rules only had limited success so far.  
Regardless of the formal recognition of a right to fair remuneration in contracts 
about the exploitation of a work, it thus remains an open question how this kind of 
fair remuneration legislation could be rendered more effective in practice.  A 
clearer statutory definition of the underlying concept of fairness, a reversal of the 
burden of proof with regard to evidence of remuneration standards in a given 
sector, and extra incentives for the creative industry to enter into collective 
negotiations with associations of authors could be considered in this context.  
Antitrust concerns and the risk of an encroachment upon the fundamental freedom 
of coalition, however, pose obstacles to the adoption of the most effective (and 
most intrusive) legislative measure:  the imposition of a legal obligation on the 
creative industry to establish binding common remuneration rules in negotiations 
with representative associations of authors and performers. 
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